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CAUSATION IN GOVERNMENT REGULATION
AND TOXIC TORTS
RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR.*
Over the past twenty years, courts, legislatures, agencies, and scholars
have devoted thousands of pages to a single generic question: Does substance
A cause injury X? Of course, to be useful to any legal institution, the
question must be restated as: Is there evidence that substance A causes injury
X that is sufficient to justify taking some action with respect to substance A
and those firms who are responsible for substance A?
The legal system uses different approaches to answer this question,
depending on the purpose for which the question is asked. It is much more
difficult to prove causation in a tort case than in a regulatory proceeding.
This should not be surprising because the causal question relevant to a tort
case differs significantly from the causal question relevant to a regulatory
proceeding. Regulatory agencies are responsible for protecting the general
public from the potential future adverse effects of toxic substances. The
regulatory restrictions they can impose often include mandatory testing,
mandatory labeling, emissions limits, exposure limits, and, in an extreme
case, a ban on a substance. When deciding whether to impose a regulatory
restriction, the agency asks whether there is sufficient evidence of a general
causal relationship between substance A and injury Xto justify imposition of
a regulatory restriction.2 By contrast, in a tort case, the court must decide
whether a particular manufacturer of substance A is legally and financially
responsible for a particular injury to a particular individual. For that purpose,
* Lyle T. Alverson Professor of Law, George Washington University. I am grateful to my
colleague Larry Hourcle for helping me understand the process through which agencies issue
emissions permits under the Clean Water Act.
1. See, e.g., Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 (1994)
(regulating hazardous waste); General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 118 S. Ct. 512 (1997) (upholding decision
that excluded evidence of toxicity in a tort case); Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst.,
448 U.S. 607 (1980) (rejecting as inadequate regulatory agency's findings with respect to toxicity of
benzene); STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK
REGULATION (1993); Troyen A. Brennan, Helping Courts with Toxic Torts: Some Proposals
Regarding Alternative Methods for Presenting and Assessing Scientific Evidence in Common Law
Courts, 51 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (1989); Peter Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public
Risk Management in the Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 277 (1985); Thomas 0. McGarity, Substantive
and Procedural Discretion in Administrative Resolution of Science Policy Questions: Regulating
Carcinogens in EPA and OSHA, 67 GEO. L.J. 729 (1979); Albert Nichols & Richard Zeckhauser,
OSHA After a Decade: A Time for Reason, in CASE STUDIES IN REGULATION 202 (Leonard W. Weiss
& Michael W. Klass eds., 198 1).
2. For an illustration of the causal reasoning typically used in the regulatory context, see Troy
Corp. v. Browner, 120 F.3d 277 (D.C. Cir.), reh "g denied, 129 F.3d 1290 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
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the court logically asks whether there is sufficient evidence to support a
finding that substance A caused injuryx.3
The two causal questions differ both with respect to their degree of
particularity and with respect to the degree of confidence with which they
must be answered. Thus, for instance, an agency often will justify imposition
of a regulation by finding that substance A has some potential to cause some
future harm to society, for example, ten premature deaths per year
attributable to cancer. The agency does not have to support its causal finding
with a high degree of confidence. Typically, the agency can predict with
confidence only that substance A has the potential to produce a wide range of
injuries, for example, between zero and one hundred premature deaths per
year attributable to cancer.4 The probability that it will cause any particular
level of injury, for example, ten deaths per year, is likely to be five percent or
less. Similarly, the agency does not have to find a causal relationship
between substance A and any particular case of cancer. By contrast, in a tort
case, the court must find that it is more probable than not that substance A
caused plaintiffB's cancer to award damages to B.
This disparate approach to causation has shaped our present legal
environment. There are only a handful of substances that trigger both a
regulatory response and an award of tort damages. There are thousands of
regulated substances that rarely, if ever, could be the subject of a successful
tort action. The available evidence is sufficient to support a finding that they
probably cause nontrivial injuries of some types, but it is insufficient to
support a finding that they probably caused any particular injury. There are
also 48,523 man-made chemicals used in commerce that are not subject to
any regulation and that cannot possibly be the basis for a successful tort
action.5 We have subjected twenty percent of those chemicals to some degree
of toxicity testing and have found no causal relationship to injuries sufficient
to justify either regulation or tort liability. We have conducted no tests of any
type, however, to determine whether the remaining eighty percent of those
chemicals cause injuries.6
This legal environment has provoked a great deal of controversy and has
spawned scores of proposals to reform government regulation, tort law, or
3. See generally LINDA S. MULLENIX, MASS TORT LITIGATION 654-793 (1996).
4. See John F. Morrall III, A Review of/the Record, REGULATION, Nov.-Dec. 1986, at 25.
5. See STEERING COMM. ON IDENTIFICATION OF ToxIc & POTENTIALLY Toxic CHEMS. FOR
CONSIDERATION BY THE NAT'L TOXICOLOGY PROGRAM, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, TOXICITY
TESTING: STRATEGIES TO DETERMINE NEEDS AND PRIORITIES 12 fig.2 (1984) [hereinafter
TOXICOLOGY TESTING].
6. See id. at 11, 84 tbi.7,94 tbl.10, 117 tbl.20.
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both.7 Commentators who view the issues through the eyes of the victims of
injuries criticize legislatures and agencies for excess timidity.8 They reserve
their harshest criticisms for tort law, however, and particularly for the
common-law requirement that a plaintiff must prove that an injury was more
probably than not caused by a particular substance.9 Conversely, those who
view the issues through the eyes of manufacturers of substances, or who
favor pursuit of economic efficiency, support some variant of the common-
law tort approach to causation and resist efforts to relax that approach. Many
of them criticize the regulatory approach to causation on the basis that it
often subjects too many substances to too much regulation.10
The debate about causation has produced numerous promising proposals
for reform. In 1997, however, two new proposals surfaced that have the
potential to turn a serious problem into an intractable problem. Two scholarly
articles, one in Columbia Law Review" and the other in Cornell Law
Review,12 urged complete abolition of the requirement that a plaintiff prove
causation in a toxic tort case. Moving in the other direction, the Third Circuit
held the citizen suit provision of the Clean Water Act ("CWA")
unconstitutional as applied, on the basis of the court's skepticism that a firm
caused any injury when it committed 150 violations of its emissions permit.' 3
The goal of this Article is to persuade readers that we should summarily
reject both of these new entrants into the great causation debate.
Part I describes and critiques the proposals to create no-cause legal
regimes applicable to all toxic tort cases. Part I concludes that these proposals
would impose intolerable costs on both the judiciary and society at large. Part
II describes and critiques the Third Circuit's constitutional test for causation
in the context of citizen suits brought to enforce the CWA. Part II concludes
that the Third Circuit's approach impermissibly reallocates decision-making
responsibility from Congress and agencies to courts. The Article argues that
we should apply a new causation per se doctrine in cases in which a firm
unlawfully exceeds the limits in its emissions permit. Ironically, while the
no-cause proposals and the Third Circuit's approach obviously come from
7. See sources cited supra note 1.
8. See, e.g., Anita Bernstein, Formed by Thalidomide: Mass Torts as a False Cure for Toxic
ETposure, 97 COLuM. L. REV. 2153 (1997); Wendy E. Wagner, Choosing Igonorance in the
Manufacture of Toxic Products, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 773, 786-89, 809 (1997).
9. See, e.g., Margaret A. Berger, Eliminating General Causation: Notes Towards a New Theory
ofJustice and Toxic Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2117 (1997); Wagner, supra note 8.
10. See, e.g., BREYER, supra note 1; Morrall, supra note 4.
11. Berger, supra note 9.
12. Wagner, supra note 8.
13. See Public Interest Research Group, Inc. v. Magnesium Elektron, Inc., 123 F.3d 111 (3d Cir.
1997).
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opposite ends of the political and ideological spectrum, they share a common
flaw. Both would assign to the judiciary tasks that it is not capable of
performing.
I. THE PROPOSALS TO ELIMINATE THE NEED TO PROVE CAUSATION
In Eliminating General Causation: Notes Towards a New Theory of
Justice and Toxic Torts,14 Margaret Berger argues that a plaintiff should no
longer be required to prove that a toxic substance caused injury to recover
from the firm that is responsible for exposing the plaintiff to the substance.
Under Berger's proposal, a plaintiff could recover from a firm that exposes
her to a toxic substance simply by proving that she suffered an injury of a
type that might be attributable to such exposure and that the firm did not
adequately test the substance to determine its toxic effects or did not
adequately warn the public of those effects.15 Once a plaintiff proves
exposure, injury, and negligent failure to test or warn, a defendant could
avoid liability only by proving that the injury could not have been caused by
exposure to the substance or that the injury was caused by exposure to
another substance.' 6 As Berger recognizes, however, a defendant rarely could
present evidence sufficient to prove either of those causal defenses 17 for the
same reasons that a plaintiff rarely can prove causation in a toxic tort case
under the present legal regime.' 8 Thus, Berger proposes a pure no-cause
negligence regime applicable to all toxic torts. Berger also proposes to
eliminate limited corporate liability in toxic tort cases. She would subject
managers, directors, and shareholders of firms to potential unlimited liability
in her proposed no-cause system.'
9
Berger supports her proposal with the following reasoning. First,
causation is the "central, decisive factor in mass tort litigation."20 Second,
potential plaintiffs rarely can prove causation because of the wide range of
scientific uncertainty regarding the causal relationship between exposure to a
substance and plaintiffs injury.2' Further, courts have applied demanding
rules in deciding whether to admit evidence of causation and in deciding
14. Berger, supra note 9.
15. Seeid. at2143-44.
16. Seeid. at2144-45.
17. See id. at 2146-49.
18. See supra text accompanying note 9.
19. See Berger, supra note 9, at 2141-43. Berger argues that this unlimited liability will give
corporate decision makers an incentive to obtain adequate information about their products. See id.
20. Id. at 2120 (citing JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION 148
(1995)).
21. See id. at2120-29.
[VOL. 76:1307
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whether plaintiffs evidence of causation is sufficient to allow a jury to
decide the case.22 Third, this requirement allows and encourages corporations
to engage in irresponsible behavior. Corporations have refused to test
adequately the substances they put on the market and refused to disclose the
dangers posed by their products.23 Fourth, because of the impossibility of
proving causation in most cases, the tort system produces both
underdeterrence of wrongful conduct and undercompensation of victims of
toxic torts.
24
Wendy Wagner makes a generically similar but more complicated
proposal in Choosing Ignorance in the Manufacture of Toxic Products.
Under Wagner's proposal, a plaintiff could establish "a prima facie case with
proof of the following: (1) inadequate minimal testing on a product, (2)
normal or foreseeable exposure to the product, and (3) serious harm that
might be causally linked to exposure to the product."26 Once the plaintiff
establishes a prima facie case, the defendant could escape liability only by
proving either that its product is "benign" or that it could not possibly have
caused plaintiffs injury.7 As Wagner recognizes, a defendant rarely would
be able to prove either of those defenses for the same reasons that a potential
plaintiff rarely can prove causation in a toxic tort case at present.2 8 Wagner
would allow the defendant the opportunity to avoid liability through one
other mechanism, however. She would provide immunity from suit for
manufacturers who have conducted a comprehensive battery of tests and
found their product to be safe.29
Wagner supports her proposed reform with a set of reasons similar to
Berger's. She concludes that the current legal regime's requirement that a
plaintiff prove causation in a toxic tort case produces severe adverse effects.
These adverse effects include an inadequate understanding of product
safety, a lack of deterrence in the development of toxic products,
undercompensation for victims who have been harmed by such
products, and even the tendency of juries and some judges to nullify
the causation rule when a defendant has been negligent in testing.
30
22. See id.
23. See id. at 2132-40.
24. Seeid. at 2133-37.
25. Wagner, supra note 8.
26. Id. at 834-35 (footnotes omitted).
27. See id. at 835-36.
28. See id.
29. See id. at 838-39.
30. Id. at 810.
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A. Critique of the Proposed No-Cause Reforms
The reforms proposed by Berger and Wagner respond to real problems.
Wagner does a particularly good job of documenting the ways in which the
current liability rules deter manufacturers from testing their products.3' It is
impossible to know the magnitude of the adverse effects on society caused
by this unintended effect of tort law, but they could be substantial. Berger's
and Wagner's no-cause proposals should be rejected, however. They would
produce a series of adverse effects far worse than the adverse effects of the
present legal regime. The direct adverse effects would include a massive
increase in the use of scarce judicial resources to decide toxic tort cases, a
massive increase in the cost of many socially beneficial products, and
unavailability of many socially beneficial products.32 The indirect effects
would include deterioration in the overall health of the population.
33
Berger and Wagner argue persuasively that courts are institutionally
incapable of resolving in a satisfactory manner the vast majority of causation
disputes that arise in toxic tort cases.34 They therefore propose to shift the
focus in all toxic tort cases from the causation question to the question of
whether a manufacturer adequately tested its product. Both apparently
believe that tort courts could answer that question more easily and more
accurately than they can answer the causation question. That belief is
mistaken.
Courts would experience extreme difficulty determining whether a
manufacturer adequately tested a product. Courts would provide a large
number of false positive answers to adequacy of testing questions, with
severe adverse effects on society. Indeed, courts make that mistake with great
frequency today. That flaw in the legal regime governing toxic torts is
masked today by the dominance of causation disputes. In the present legal
environment an erroneous judicial determination that a manufacturer did not
adequately test a product rarely has any adverse effect. As Berger and
Wagner demonstrate, such a determination rarely renders a manufacturer
31. See id. at 774-96; see also Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation,
95 COLUM. L. REv. 1613 (1995).
32. See infra Part I.D.
33. See infra text accompanying notes 121-23.
34. See Berger, supra note 9, at 2120-29; Wagner, supra note 8, at 790-96. Proof of causation
has become more difficult since Wagner and Berger wrote their articles. In General Electric Co. v.
Joiner, 118 S. Ct. 512 (1997), the Court seemed to raise the hurdle for admission of evidence of
causation by suggesting that animal studies should rarely, if ever, be admitted. See id. at 518. Further,
the court held that a district court could exclude expert testimony on causation when only supported by
insufficiently connected epidemiological studies. See id. at 519.
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liable because a plaintiff rarely can prove causation.35 In the no-cause regime
proposed by Berger and Wagner, however, an erroneous judicial
determination that a manufacturer failed to test a product adequately would
determine the outcome in the vast majority of cases.
B. An Illustrative Application of the No-Cause Model
The fallacies that underlie the no-cause proposals can be illustrated by
analyzing a hypothetical case under the proposed legal regime. Suppose that
Tom Smith is diagnosed with cancer. Given the nature and stage of Tom's
cancer, the prognosis is poor. His doctor tells him that he almost certainly
will die of cancer within three years. Understandably, Tom begins to search
for someone to blame for his illness and impending death. Tom wants the
guilty party to compensate him and his surviving dependents.
Tom's search takes him to a toxicologically literate lawyer. Tom and his
lawyer can quickly rule out the most obvious potential causes of his cancer.
Tom has never smoked and has never been exposed to friable asbestos. In the
new no-cause legal regime, however, Tom and his lawyer can identify many
thousands of other promising defendants.
The toxicology literature identifies two particularly promising
defendants-Starbuck's and Florida's Natural. For the past ten years, Tom
drank a six ounce glass of Florida's Natural orange juice and a six ounce cup
of Starbuck's coffee every morning. Both orange juice and coffee contain
known animal carcinogens. Orange juice contains d-limonene,36 while coffee
contains nineteen known animal carcinogens, the most powerful of which is
caffeic acid.37 These are naturally occurring toxic substances, but it is
hornbook law that a manufacturer can be held liable for exposing consumers
to a naturally occurring toxic substance by including that substance in its
product. Cigarette makers and asbestos manufacturers have both been held
liable for billions of dollars under this theory.38
Both Florida's Natural and Starbuck's would face formidable obstacles in
any attempt to defend against Tom's tort action in a no-cause legal regime.
35. See Wagner, supra note 8, at 790-96; Berger, supra note 9, at 2120-29.
36. See Lois Swirsky Gold et al., Rodent Carcinogens: Setting Priorities, 258 SCIENCE 261, 263
(1992).
37. See id. at 262.
38. See, e.g., Milo Geyelin, States Agree to $206 Billion Tobacco Deal, WALL ST. J., Nov. 23,
1998, at B9; The Year in Review: Lawyer of the Year: Michael Moore, He Smoked Out Tobacco,
NAT'L L.J., Dec. 29, 1997-Jan. 5, 1998, at B7 (reporting multibillion dollar settlements by cigarette
manufacturers); JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE AD Hoc COMMITTEE
ON ASBESTOS LITIGATION (1991) (describing the many court cases in which manufacturers of products
that contain asbestos have been held liable).
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The natural ingredients of orange juice and coffee are certainly "plausible"
causes of Tom's cancer. Indeed, they are far more plausible than many of the
substances that have attracted the attention of regulators. Toxicologists often
use the HERP (human exposure/rodent potency) value of a substance as a
measure of its relative carcinogenicity. 39 The HERP values of the d-limonene
in orange juice and the caffeic acid in coffee are identical-0.04.40 By
contrast, the controversial pestiside Alar has a HERP value of 0.00241 -more
than an order of magnitude less than the HERP values of orange juice and
coffee. Moreover, the natural ingredients in orange juice and coffee are more
carcinogenic by six to eight orders of magnitude than three of the synthetic
substances that the National Research Council ("NRC") has identified as
posing relatively high potential risks to humans. 4
2
Given the available scientific evidence, Florida's Natural and Starbuck's
would have no chance of defending against Tom's claim by arguing either
that their products are "benign" or that Tom's cancer was caused by exposure
to some other substance. This would leave them with only one possible
defense under the Berger and Wagner proposals. They must argue that they
adequately tested the toxicity of their products and then adequately disclosed
to the public the results of their testing program. The court would need to
determine what constitutes adequate testing of a potentially toxic substance.
This Article addresses that extraordinarily important and difficult question in
detail in Part I.C. For now, a few numbers are sufficient to illustrate the
potential range of answers to that question. The lowest cost test of any
value-the Ames Salmonella microsome test ("Salmonella assay")--costs
less than $10,000. 43 The tests required for a substance under the Toxic
Substances Control Act ("TSCA") may cost between $300,000 and
$700,000.44 The tests required to obtain Food and Drug Administration
("FDA") approval of a proposed new drug can cost, on average, an estimated
$231 million.45 Moreover, even compliance with the FDA's testing protocols
39. See Gold et al., supra note 36, at 261.
40. See id. at 263 tbl.2.
41. See id.
42. See id. at 262-63.
43. See S. Stanley Young, Do Short-Term Tests Predict Rodent Carcinogenicity? 241 SCIENCE
1232, 1232 (1988).
44. See LYNDON B. JOHNSON SCHOOL OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, POLICY RESEARCH PROJECT REP.
No. 50, THE TOXIC SUBSTANCES CONTROL ACT: OVERVIEW AND EVALUATION 121 (1982).
45. See Veronica Henry, Problems with Pharmaceutical Regulation in the United States: Drug
Lag and Orphan Drugs, 14 J. LEGAL MED. 617, 617 (1993). I will use that estimate throughout this
Article for lack of a better estimate. The $231 million estimate may be unduly high for two reasons.
First, it includes the cost of basic research and development, in addition to the cost of FDA-required
testing. Second, it includes the cost of research, development, and testing of substances that are never
approved by FDA. On the other hand, the estimate may be unduly low for another reason. The $231
1314 [VOL. 76:1307
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does not ensure that a firm has engaged in adequate testing. Both Wagner
and Berger criticize, as inadequate, the amount of testing done on certain
FDA-approved products.46 Further, many courts have determined that
compliance with the FDA's testing protocols does not satisfy a firm's
common-law duty to engage in adequate testing.4 7
Florida's Natural and Starbuck's would have little chance of prevailing by
arguing that they adequately tested orange juice and coffee and adequately
disclosed the known toxic risks posed by their products. The known animal
carcinogens in orange juice and coffee have been subjected to some toxicity
tests. But they have not been subjected to nearly as much testing as have
many substances that have been, according to the judiciary, inadequately
tested.48 Moreover, many of the tests of orange juice and coffee have been
positive.49 Under the Berger and Wagner proposals, these positive findings
would trigger a duty to engage in more extensive testing and a duty to
disclose the positive results of the completed tests. Florida's Natural and
Starbuck's would face a near certain decision that they failed to provide
adequate warnings and that they did not adequately test their products.
Therefore, in a no-cause legal regime, they would be required to compensate
Tom and his survivors.
Tom could sue thousands of firms in addition to Florida's Natural and
Starbuck's. If Tom chooses not to sue other firms, Florida's Natural and
Starbuck's could implead them as codefendants. Tom, Florida's Natural, or
Starbuck's could identify scores of other known animal carcinogens to which
Tom has been exposed. Those carcinogens would include substances known
to exist in all wine, beer, lettuce, root beer, apples, mushrooms, pears, plums,
million estimate was based on costs incurred between 1970 and 1982. Costs of drug research,
development, and testing have increased significantly in recent years. See Nina Crimm, A Tax
Proposal to Promote Pharmacological Research, to Encourage Conventional Prescription Drug
Innovation and Improvement, and to Reduce Product Liability Claims, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
1007, 1032-36 (1994). The Office of Technology Assessment estimated that the total cost of research,
development, and testing required to bring a new drug to market was $259 million to $359 million in
1990 dollars, and that the after-tax cost of complying with FDA testing requirements was $140 million
to $194 million per successful drug in 1990 dollars. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT,
PHARMACEUTICAL R&D: COSTS, RISKS AND REWARDS 47-72 (1993).
46. See Wagner, supra note 8, at 828-30 (criticizing amount of testing of Bendectin as negligent
and inadequate); Berger, supra note 9, at 2135 (same).
47. See Oxendine v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 649 A.2d 825, 828 (D.C. 1994) (citing "numerous
cases which have specifically held that the FDA prescription drug regulations and safety
determinations are intended to be minimum standards which 'do not conflict with state law which sets
higher standards for due care and safety in the manufacture of drugs."' (quoting Allen v. G.D. Searle
& Co., 708 F. Supp. 1142, 1152 (D. Or. 1989))).
48. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
49. See Gold et al., supra note 36, at 262-63.
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peanut butter, tea, celery, carrots, bread, and chlorinated water.50 Tom
undoubtedly has been exposed to these carcinogens by thousands of firms
that bake bread, operate swimming pools, and make hundreds of food
products that include one of the many fruits and vegetables that contain
animal carcinogens.
Additionally, there are 48,523 unregulated synthetic chemicals used in
commerce.51 Eighty percent of those chemicals have not been subjected to
any toxicity tests.52 Fifty percent of all substances that have been tested to
date have been shown to be animal carcinogens. 3 A high percentage of all
products available in the United States contain one or more of the 38,818
unregulated and untested synthetic chemicals.54 Thus, with a little research,
Tom, Florida's Natural, or Starbuck's could establish that virtually every
firm from which Tom has purchased a product has exposed him to one or
more potential carcinogens.
In attempting to avoid liability for Tom's cancer, each of these firms
would confront obstacles similar to those confronted by Florida's Natural
and Starbuck's. Under the Berger or Wagner proposals, the complete dearth
of evidence suggesting any causal link between exposure to a substance and
Tom's cancer would be totally irrelevant Tom's injury "might be causally
linked to exposure to the product."55 This would be sufficient to establish a
prima facie case for recovery from each firm. No firm in this category would
have any chance of proving that its product is benign, that some other
product caused Tom's injury, or that the firm adequately tested its product.
Thus, each of these firms would be completely defenseless and would be
held liable to Tom. That should come as no surprise, of course. Berger and
Wagner intend to correct the alleged irresponsibility of these firms by
exposing each firm to tort liability unless it tests all of the chemical
constituents of its products.
Berger and Wagner appear not to recognize the staggering scope of their
proposals. In addition to the 38,818 untested and unregulated synthetic
chemicals used in commerce, there are thousands of untested, unregulated,
naturally-occurring substances used in commerce.56  The available
50. See id.
51. See TOXICOLOGY TESTING, supra note 5, at 12 fig.2.
52. See id. at 11, 84 tbl.7, 94 tbl.10, 117 tbl.20.
53. See Gold et al., supra note 36, at 261.
54. The United States made or imported 5.9 trillion pounds of chemicals in 1989. See Maurice
Zeeman, Our Fate Is Connected with the Animals, 46 BIOSCIENCE 542, 544 (1996) (book review)
(citing INFORM, TOXICS WATCH 1995 (1995).
55. Wagner, supra note 8, at 835.
56. See Gold et al., supra note 36, at 261.
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toxicological evidence provides no basis to distinguish between those two
classes of untested, unregulated substances.57 Nor do present legal doctrines
support any such distinction.58 Thus, in the no-cause legal environment
proposed by Berger and Wagner, exposure to any substance would be the
basis for liability in a toxic tort case unless the firm that is responsible for the
exposure could prove that it engaged in adequate premarket testing. The root
of this problem is the absence of any definition of "toxic substances" that can
be used to discriminate among the tens of thousands of synthetic and
naturally-occurring substances that have not been subjected to
comprehensive testing.59
Before I turn to the difficulties inherent in applying such a universal,
outcome-determinative duty-to-test rule, it is useful to consider the enormous
number of cases illustrated by Tom's case. Each year in the United States
there are 1.3 million cases of cancer diagnosed6° and over 500,000 deaths
from cancer.61 Also, many other serious diseases might be causally linked to
exposure to a toxic substance. For instance, in the United States, at least
117,000 children are born with birth defects each year.62 Teratology-the
study of birth defects--was largely dormant until the 1960s. 63 The
thalidomide tragedy greatly increased the incidence of testing of substances
to determine their teratogenic potential. 64 Most substances have not been
tested, of course, but the results of the limited teratological testing that has
been completed roughly parallel the results of the carcinogenicity testing. A
high proportion of all substances tested to date appear to have some
teratogenic potential. There are nine hundred known animal teratogens.65
57. See id. Naturally-occuring substances and synthetic substances have the same rate of positive
test results. See id.
58. Manufacturers of cigarettes and asbestos have been held liable for including naturally-
occurring toxic ingredients in their products. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
59. See Sean D. Murphy, Prospective Liability Regimes for the Transboundary Movement of
Hazardous Wastes, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 24, 27-29 (1994) (reporting that there is no consistent definition
of toxic substances either in international law or in domestic laws of any country).
60. See W. JOHN DIAMOND ET AL., AN ALTERNATIVE MEDICINE DEFINITIVE GUIDE TO CANCER
526 (1997).
61. See BREYER, supra note 1, at 6-7 (citation omitted).
62. There are 3.9 million babies born in the United States each year. See National Center for
Health Statistics, Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, Births, Marriages, Divorces, and Deaths
for January 1997, MONTHLY VITAL STATISTICS REP., Aug. 14, 1997, at 1, 1. Between three and seven
percent of all babies are born with serious defects. See Patricia E. Levi, Principles and Mechanisms of
Teratogenesis, in TERATOGENS: CHEMICALS WHICH CAUSE BIRTH DEFECTS 1, 8 (Vera M. Kolb ed.,
2d ed. 1993).
63. See Levi, supra note 62, at 1-2.
64. See id. at 2.
65. See Doris K. Kolb, Teratogenic Chemicals in Undergraduate Chemistry Laboratories, in
TERATOGENS: CHEMICALS WHICH CAUSE BIRTH DEFECTS, supra note 62, at 75, 79.
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They include many antibiotics, soy beans, cottonseed oil, sugar, vitamin A,
alcohol, and oxygen.
66
Thus, even if the universe of toxic tort cases were limited to cancer and
birth defects, the courts could be required to resolve over a million toxic tort
cases per year in the no-cause legal environment proposed by Berger and
Wagner. Each case would look like Tom's case. Each would probably
involve over one thousand defendants and many thousands of substances.
With respect to each product, the central question would be whether the
manufacturer of the product had adequately tested each of the substances
contained in the product before it marketed the product. The answer to that
question would be outcome-determinative in virtually all cases.
C. What Constitutes Adequate Testing?
The effects of the no-cause proposals depend entirely on the capability of
judges and juries to determine how much testing a manufacturer must
implement before it uses any substance in its products. If courts can perform
that task with tolerable resource costs and accuracy, a no-cause legal
environment would produce only the socially-beneficial results claimed by
Berger and Wagner. If courts err in that process, however, the legal regime
Berger and Wagner propose would have a wide range of serious adverse
effects on society. To illustrate this potential, consider what would happen if
courts held that a firm could satisfy the common-law duty to test by
implementing the FDA testing protocol applicable to proposed new drugs. If
courts applied this holding to the 38,878 untested, unregulated man-made
chemicals now in commerce, it would impose immediate direct costs on the
economy of almost nine trillion dollars.67 That is equal to the annual U.S.
domestic product. As I will explain in Part I.D, such a holding also would
have devastating effects on the health of the U.S. population.
Berger and Wagner differ significantly with respect to the degree of
confidence each has in the competence of courts to determine the optimal
amount of testing of a potentially toxic substance. Berger expresses complete
confidence in the ability of courts to make such determinations. She
describes the task of determining the scope of the duty to test as "fact-finding
that is well-suited to the jury's role as a representative of the community. 68
She contrasts that task with the present requirements that judges screen
66. See id. at 84; Levi, supra note 62, at 7-12.
67. 38,878 substances times $231 million equals $8.98 trillion.
68. Berger, supra note 9, at 2151.
[VOL. 76:1307
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol76/iss4/3
1998] CAUSATION IN GOVERNMENT REGULATION AND TOXIC TORTS 1319
evidence through application of the difficult Daubert6 9 test and that juries
consider scientific evidence of causation that "they cannot properly
appraise.
' 70
Berger also applauds the judicial decisions that have imposed liability on
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, the manufacturer of Bendectin, 71 even though
she recognizes that the many extensive studies of Bendectin have failed to
produce any credible evidence that Bendectin has the potential to cause the
birth defects for which its manufacturer has been held liable.72 In Berger's
view, the manufacturer of Bendectin should be held liable for "thousands of
cases" of birth defects Bendectin may not have caused because "Merrell
gambled with people's lives. 73 This characterization of Merrell's conduct
provides a good insight into Berger's views on how juries would, and should,
apply the duty to test in a no-cause environment. The manufacturer of
Bendectin complied with all of the FDA's premarket testing protocols and
then commissioned extensive postmarket studies when questions were raised
about Bendectin's potential teratogenic effects.74 The FDA found the firm's
tests sufficient to demonstrate the safety of the drug.7 5 Berger obviously
believes that juries would, and should, define the duty to test to require more
substantial tests than those required by FDA. It would be interesting to find
out whether Berger also would conclude that Florida's Natural and
Starbuck's should be held liable in thousands (or millions) of cases because
they "gambled with people's lives." They have engaged in much less testing
of their products than Merrell and there is much stronger evidence of the
toxic potential of orange juice and coffee than of Bendectin. Furthermore,
Florida's Natural and Starbuck's expose far more people to much higher
concentrations of their "toxic products" than Merrell.
Wagner does not share Berger's faith in courts' ability to define and apply
a duty to test in a no-cause environment. Her survey of the testing literature
convinces her that: (1) there is no consensus with respect to types of tests that
are appropriate in various circumstances;76 (2) the range of potential testing
protocols is extraordinarily wide;77 (3) even the most comprehensive
69. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
70. Berger, supra note 9, at 2151.
71. See id at 2146-48.
72. Seeid. at2146.
73. 1d. at2148.
74. See Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 799, 801-03 (D.D.C. 1986).
75. See id at 803.
76. See Wagner, supra note 8, at 780-90, 836-52.
77. See i.
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protocols will leave many important questions unanswered; 78 and (4) the
protocols at the upper end of the range are "simply too expensive."79
Given this situation, Wagner recognizes that courts "will not be
competent to implement °80 her proposed reform without significant
assistance from other institutions. She also recognizes, "Given the large
penalties associated with a failure to conduct [adequate] testing, and the
enormous transaction costs associated with an unclear rule, clarity of the
testing requirements must be the first priority for a reform. 81 Wagner then
looks in the right directions to find institutions that offer comparative
advantages over courts as sources of a clear, rational set of rules with respect
to the scope of the duty to test. She urges Congress to authorize one or more
agencies with toxicological expertise to develop national checklists of the
tests that would satisfy the duty to test in various circumstances.8 2
To make the process of defining the duty to test manageable, Wagner
urges initial issuance of only two sets of checklists: a minimal checklist and a
state-of-the-art checklist 8 3 Wagner suggests that the minimal testing list
might consist only of the relatively inexpensive Salmonella assay.84 Any firm
responsible for exposing any individual to any substance that has not been
subjected to minimal testing would be liable per se for any harm that befalls
that individual.8 5 Conversely, a firm would be immune from liability if it
implements the state-of-the-art checklist.8 6 Wagner recognizes that the task
of devising an appropriate state-of-the-art checklist is daunting. "[lit will be
difficult (to put it modestly) to reach consensus on a single testing regime
that would provide both a reliable and cost-effective decision-tree for
adequate safety testing."87 Despite the extreme difficulty of the task, Wagner
maintains that "a clear outline of testing requirements... is essential to avoid
extended litigation over the nature and extent of the testing requirements." 88
Wagner's proposal looks in the right directions for answers to
complicated issues of science, economics, and public policy. The
legislatively-authorized, agency-developed minimal and state-of-the-art
testing checklists she proposes provide a promising start for reform of the
78. See id.
79. Id. at 850.
80. Id. at 841.
81. Id. at 837 n.238 (citations omitted).
82. See id. at 841-43.
83. See id. at 842.
84. See id. at 843.
85. See id. at 833-36.
86. See id. at 838.
87. Id. at 843 n.253.
88. Id at 844.
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toxic torts legal regime. Wagner's proposal is inadequate, however, because
it fails to address adequately a category of substances that includes about
20,000 chemicals, including chemicals that are contained in virtually all
fruits and vegetables.
8 9
Under Wagner's proposal, every firm that exposes individuals to any
substance would be required to conduct a Salmonella assay to avoid
unlimited liability for every disease contracted by any individual who is
exposed to the substance. Wagner asserts that this mandate passes a cost-
benefit test, given the valuable information provided by the test and its low
cost.9° The claim seems defensible. If the Salmonella assay produces
negative results, a firm presumably would have no duty to conduct additional
tests absent some other reason for concern about the potential toxicity of the
substance. Wagner recognizes that the Salmonella assay is far from a perfect
predictor of toxicity. It has a fifty percent false negative rate with respect to
carcinogenicity, and it has no ability to predict teratogenic or neurotoxic
effects. 91 Again, however, Wagner defends the proposed use of a negative
result of a Salmonella assay as prima facie satisfaction of the minimum duty
to test with reference to a cost-benefit analysis. There are no available
inexpensive tests of neurotoxicity or teratogenicity, and the available tests
that can increase the accuracy of a prediction of carcinogenicity are so
expensive that they are not ordinarily cost-justified in the presence of a
negative Salmonella assay result 92 Again, Wagner's judgement seems
entirely defensible.
Under Wagner's proposal, when a firm satisfies the minimum testing
requirement, whether or not the test is positive, "the burden of proving
causation returns to the plaintiff and the traditional tort rules determine
recovery." 93 The problem with Wagner's proposal is that a positive test may
trigger a duty to engage in additional testing under the common-law rules.94
But Wagner argues that, under the traditional judicial approach to causation,
a positive Salmonella assay would not affect the outcome of many toxic tort
89. There are 38,818 untested, unregulated synthetic chemicals plus thousands of untested
naturally-occurring chemicals used in commerce. See supra notes 51, 52 and accompanying text. Fifty
percent of all substances that have been tested to date have been shown to be animal carcinogens. See
supra note 53 and accompanying text. Thus, it is fair to infer that about 20,000 of the untested
chemicals would be shown to be animal carcinogens if they were tested.
90. See Wagner, supra note 8, at 843 n.257. The Salmonella assay costs less than $10,000. See
Young, supra note 43.
91. See Wagner, supra note 8, at 844 n.257.
92. See id.
93. Id. at 836.
94. See id. at 836.
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cases.95 A plaintiff armed only with a positive result of a Salmonella assay is
highly unlikely to prevail with respect to the causation issue. Given the
difficulty the plaintiff would confront in proving causation, Wagner suggests
that the open-ended nature of the duty to engage in further testing when a
Salmonella assay is positive would have no practical effect on the legal
environment.
96
I doubt that Wagner is right on this point for four reasons. First, as
Wagner documents, the existence of a single positive or inconclusive
epidemiological study of a substance can "lead to plaintiffs' verdicts and
increased filings."97 A single positive or inconclusive epidemiological study
is a low price of admission for a plaintiff to pay to obtain jury application of
an open-ended duty to engage in further testing. Second, as Wagner also
documents, judges and juries often "nullify" the causation requirement when
they are persuaded that a firm has not adequately tested a substance.98 Judges
and juries become so angry at what they perceive to be the irresponsible
conduct of the firm that they award damages in cases in which the causal
evidence is extremely weak. Third, it is easy to predict that judges and juries
would become angry at a firm that does no follow up tests after receiving a
positive result of a Salmonella assay. Wagner's proposal would invite that
reaction and the resulting exposure to liability in every case in which a firn
obtains a positive result on the Salmonella assay. Fourth, if courts adopt the
other elements of Wagner's proposal, they are likely to extend the apparent
logic of Wagner's no-cause proposal and eliminate the requirement to prove
causation in cases in which a substance has produced a positive result on a
Salmonella assay. Wagner would subject to unlimited per se liability any
firm that exposes people to a substance that the firm has absolutely no reason
to believe has any potential harmful effects. Yet, Wagner would insulate
from liability a firm that exposes the public to a substance that has tested
positive for carcinogenicity on the only test the firm has implemented. From
the perspective of a judge who lacks Wagner's sophisticated understanding
of the testing literature, the distinction Wagner urges would seem illogical.
That distinction seems totally inconsistent with the definition of negligence.
99
The positive result of the Salmonella assay obviously increases the
foreseeable risk of injury attributable to the substance.
Wagner is not clear about the scope of the duty to test she proposes when
95. See id at 836-37.
96. See id.
97. Id. at 817-18.
98. See id. at 827-32.
99. See, e.g., United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
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a Salmonella assay yields a positive result. She notes that, in theory, a firm
that obtains positive or inconclusive results from its initial testing should
"conduct continuous epidemiological studies to monitor the chemical's effect
on exposed populations. ' '1°° She then abandons that approach as impractical,
however. 10' She apparently believes that it is unnecessary to address this
issue in detail because she does not expect it to arise in many cases. Wagner
emphasizes that the Salmonella assay has a false positive rate of less than
twenty percent.102 She implies that the test is so accurate that a firm
ordinarily should react to a positive result by declining to market the
substance unless it is willing to devote a lot of resources to an elaborate
premarket testing program.1
0 3
Wagner's approach might be defensible if the Salmonella assay actually
had a relevant false positive rate of less than twenty percent. It does not. The
false positive rate logically relevant to the question of human carcinogenicity
is calculated by dividing the number of cases in which the Salmonella assay
produces a positive result by the number of cases in which a substance is
shown to induce cancer in humans at the levels at which humans are likely to
be exposed to the substance. Wagner uses the term "false positive rate" to
refer to a very different calculation, however. In her words, "over eighty
percent of the time, the positive Salmonella assay results accurately predict
cancer in rodents."' 4 Thus, the test has less than a twenty percent false
positive rate only if we are interested in predicting rodent carcinogenicity.
Rodent carcinogenicity massively overpredicts human carcinogenicity for
two reasons. 0 5 First, there is a problem of interspecies extrapolation. Many
rodent carcinogens appear not to be human carcinogens at any dose level we
can observe.'0 6 Second, there is a problem of extrapolation of the dose-
response curve. We determine whether a substance is a rodent carcinogen by
exposing rodents to doses of the substance far in excess of the level of
exposure of any human. 0 7 Thus, for instance, the study that found that
saccharin is a rodent carcinogen used a testing protocol in which rodents
were exposed to quantities of saccharin equivalent to 800 cans of diet soda
per day.'0 8 The vast majority of rodent carcinogens are not human
00. Wagner, supra note 8, at 842 n.253.
101. See id.
102. See id. at 843 n.257.
103. See id. at 837 n.237.
104. Id. (emphasis added).
105. See Gold et al., supra note 36, at 261,264.
106. See id. at 261.
107. See id. at 264.
108. See JERRY L. MASHAW ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW
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carcinogens at any level of exposure remotely relevant to humans."0 9 Rodent
carcinogenicity has a false positive rate that greatly exaggerates risk when
applied to humans. Thus, the Salmonella assay also has a large false positive
rate relevant to prediction of human carcinogenicity. 10
The scope of the problem created by these high false positive rates can be
illustrated with reference to two types of data. First, almost every fruit and
vegetable contains at least one known rodent carcinogen."' It does not
follow that we should stop eating fruits and vegetables unless we subject
each to a massive testing program. To the contrary, increasing consumption
of fruit and vegetables is second only to smoking cessation as a means of
reducing a person's risk of contracting cancer." 2 The naturally-occurring
rodent carcinogens in fruits and vegetables are more toxic than many of the
synthetic chemicals we regulate. Nevertheless, they do not pose nearly
enough danger to justify a product ban, a per se liability regime, or a legal
mandate to engage in further testing. Second, half of all substances that have
been tested to date have been shown to be rodent carcinogens." 3 Thus, it is
likely that about half of the 38,818 untested synthetic chemicals and of the
thousands of untested naturally-occurring chemicals used in commerce will
prove to be rodent carcinogens. Therefore, Wagner's proposal provides an
inadequate alternative to the current regime because rodent carcinogenicity
tests have such a high rate of false positives when applied to humans.
D. Costs of a No-Cause Rule
Adoption of a no-cause toxic tort regime would impose four types of
costs on society. The most direct and obvious costs are the costs of the testing
itself. Those direct costs produce two indirect costs: a reduction in the
availability of socially-beneficial products and a reduction in the quality of
health of the U.S. population. The Wagner proposal would impose costs
approximately one-half as large as the costs imposed by the Berger proposal,
because about one-half of the substances subjected to the Salmonella assay
SYSTEM 126 (3d ed. 1992).
109. See Gold et al., supra note 36, at 264. The same problems affect teratological determinations.
There are 900 known rodent teratogens, but only 30 are believed to be human teratogens. See Kolb,
supra note 65, at 79.
110. See Gold et al., supra note 36, at 261. Gold et al. attribute this exaggerated risk to testing at
the maximum tolerated dose in rodents, which "frequently can cause chronic cell killing and
consequent cell replacement (a risk factor for cancer that can be limited to high doses)." Id.
111. See Gold et al., supra note 36, at 261.
112. See id. at 264. See generally NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, DIET AND HEALTH:
IMPLICATIONS FOR REDUCING CHRONIC DISEASE RISK (1989).
113. See Gold et al., supra note 36, at 261.
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would test negative.
Both proposals would also impose direct costs in the form of commitment
of scarce judicial resources to the task of applying the open-ended duty to test
to tens of thousands of substances. Given the basic characteristics of our
judicial system-heavy reliance on juries to resolve all issues of fact and
decentralized allocation of lawmaking responsibility among fifty
jurisdictions-each of the tens of thousands of substances would be the
subject of multiple trials. If each substance were the subject of only a single
trial in each jurisdiction, Berger's pure no-cause proposal would require
approximately one million trials in which a judge and jury would have to
decide whether a firm adequately tested a substance before including it in a
product. The Wagner proposal would require about half as many proceedings
of that type.
Estimating the testing costs of a no-cause rule requires prediction of the
results of hundreds of thousands of jury trials with respect to the adequacy of
testing of tens of thousands of substances. That is a daunting task. There are
good reasons to predict, however, that juries would apply a duty to test at
least as demanding as the FDA testing protocol for approval of new drugs.
First, juries often have held that substances that had been subjected to the
FDA protocol were inadequately tested." 4 It would take only a few such
decisions to convince manufacturers that the FDA protocol is the minimum
legally safe level of testing. Second, there is no finite limit on the amount of
testing that can enhance our understanding of the potential risks that are
posed by a substance. We still lack a good understanding of the scope and
magnitude of many of the risks posed by asbestos and thalidomide even after
we have spent billions of dollars over a period of several decades and
conducted hundreds of tests of both." 5 Third, determining the optimal level
of testing of a substance requires application of an extraordinarily
complicated combination of scientific and economic expertise. Juries are not
good at performing tasks of that type.'1 6 Finally, each case would pit a
sympathetic injured individual against a large institution. Juries have
powerful systemic biases against defendants in that context."
7
Indeed, we can use Berger's powerful visceral reaction to the adequacy of
the testing programs conducted by numerous firms as a rough proxy for the
jury verdicts we could expect in most cases. Berger characterizes as
114. See supra note 47.
115. See Bernstein, supra note 8, at 2156; Berger, supra note 9, at 2119 n.7.
116. See Huber, supra note 1, at 314-26.
117. See James K. Hammitt et al., Tort Standards and Jury Decisions, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 751,
754-56 (1985).
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"irresponsible' testing programs that met, or surpassed, the FDA
requirements for approval of a new drug.' 18 The estimated testing costs of the
complete no-cause regime proposed by Berger is at least ten trillion
dollars.1 9 That is a conservative estimate based on the assumption that no
jury would find inadequate a testing program equivalent to the FDA protocol.
Of course, that assumption is unsupportable. Just a few jury verdicts finding
such a program inadequate would force firms to incur much higher testing
costs, and it is easy to predict at least a few jury verdicts of that type.120 On
the same conservative basis, the Wagner proposal would cost about five
trillion dollars.
Many firms would withdraw a substance from the market rather than
spend the $231 million required to test the substance to the extent necessary
to minimize the risk of incurring liability for every case of cancer and every
defective baby born in the United States. The number of substances
withdrawn would increase, of course, if even a few juries found that
conformance with FDA testing protocols is inadequate. Tens of thousands of
socially-beneficial products containing those substances would therefore be
withdrawn from the market.
Finally, the health of the U.S. population would deteriorate significantly
for three reasons. First, many healthful products would be withdrawn from
the market. We could still buy apples but probably not apple pie, spinach but
probably not spinach quiche, etc. The reduced availability of products that
contain fruits and vegetables would reduce the average intake of fruits and
vegetables. That, in turn, would increase the incidence of cancer
significantly. 12  Second, some healthful products would remain on the
market, but at the higher price necessary to reflect the cost of the judicially-
mandated testing. Thus, for instance, orange juice probably would remain
available because consumer demand for orange juice is so high that firms
would spend the millions of dollars necessary to test it adequately. Products
of that type would be more expensive, however, so their consumption would
decline. That also would increase the incidence of cancer and many other
diseases. Third, the rate of introduction of new synthetic substances on the
market would decline dramatically. A firm would have to be confident of
118. Berger, supra note 9, at 2146-48.
119. Ten trillion dollars would cover the cost of subjecting 43,290 substances to the FDA testing
protocol. There are 38,818 untested man-made chemicals plus several thousand untested naturally-
occurring chemicals that are used in commerce. Moreover, the vast majority of the ten thousand plus
substances that have been subjected to some testing have not been subjected to any testing program
remotely comparable to the FDA protocol.
120. See supra note 47.
121. See NATIONALRESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 112, at 657-58.
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obtaining an extraordinarily lucrative market to justify spending hundreds of
millions of dollars for the right to begin selling a new substance. That also
would have serious adverse health effects. On average, new substances pose
lower health risks than older substances. 122 The two most serious toxic
substance problems we have encountered to date involve two ancient,
naturally-occurring substances-asbestos and tobacco.1
2 3
E. Summary of Evaluation of No-Cause Proposals
The no-cause toxic tort regimes proposed by Berger and Wagner should
be summarily rejected. They share the same fatal defect-they would impose
on the courts vast new decision-making responsibilities. Courts are
inappropriate institutions to bear those responsibilities. Courts lack the
competence to bear responsibilities of this type in three different senses of
the word competence. They are technically incompetent, in the sense that
they lack the sophisticated understanding of toxicology and economics
necessary to define the scope of the duty to test substances to determine their
toxic potential. They are procedurally incompetent, in the sense that the
procedures they can use to gather and to evaluate the massive data relevant to
decisions of this type are totally inadequate to the task. Finally, they are
politically incompetent. A decision to adopt a no-cause toxic tort regime
would have massive implications for human health and for the performance
of the economy. Any decision of that type should be made by institutions that
are more politically accountable than courts.
It would be neither fair nor accurate, however, simply to treat these two
no-cause proposals as rough equivalents. The Berger and Wagner proposals
differ significantly. Wagner recognizes the institutional limitations of the
courts and strives to avoid burdening them with new responsibilities they
cannot fulfill. I believe that her proposal is inadequate because it
unintentionally assigns to courts daunting new responsibilities that Wagner
recognizes to be beyond their institutional competence. Wagner is looking
for solutions in the right direction, however. She is attempting to allocate
responsibilities to the combination of institutions-legislatures and
agencies-that are far more capable of fulfilling those responsibilities. She
may be able to supplement her initial proposal with additional elements that
would provide a promising means of addressing the problems she documents
122. See generally Peter Huber, The Old-New Division in Risk Regulation, 69 VA. L. REV. 1025
(1983).
123. Asbestos, a family of naturally occurring minerals, was used broadly by the ancient Greeks
and Romans. See PAUL BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT 10-11 (1985).
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without creating the unintended adverse collateral effects ascribed to her
proposal.
II. THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S CONSTITUTIONAL TEST FOR CAUSATION
The other new entrant in the great causation debate is the Third Circuit's
decision holding the citizen suit provision of the Clean Water Act
("CWA") 124 unconstitutional as applied because the plaintiffs could not
prove that unlawful emissions caused them injury. 2 That entry in the debate
obviously comes from the opposite end of the political and ideological
spectrum from the no-cause proposal. Ironically, however, it is premised on
the same basic misunderstanding of the relative competence of alternative
legal institutions. Like the Berger no-cause proposal, the Third Circuit's
approach burdens courts with responsibilities they cannot bear and falls to
appreciate the major comparative advantages of legislatures and agencies in
determining causal relationships in the context of toxic substances.
In Public Interest Research Group, Inc. v. Magnesium Elektron, Inc.,26
the Third Circuit announced and applied a constitutional test for standing
which requires courts to determine whether substance A causes injury X.127
Under the Third Circuit's test, a plaintiff must establish the causal
relationship between substance A and injury X to the satisfaction of a court
even if an agency, acting under authority delegated by Congress, has already
determined that substance A causes injury X. This new approach to causation
has the same basic flaws as the proposed new no-cause legal regimes. It is
based on a serious misunderstanding of the relative competence of courts,
legislatures, and agencies.
The plaintiffs ("TIRG") in Magnesium Elektron filed an action under the
citizen suit provision of the CWA. That provision authorizes "any citizen" to
bring an action for civil penalties and injunctive relief against anyone who
violates the CWA. 128 Congress used considerable care in drafting the citizen
suit provision of CWA in a way that would keep courts from having to
become enmeshed in difficult scientific or policy disputes. Three features of
the CWA and the citizen suit provision illustrate the congressional pursuit of
this goal. First, the CWA is drafted in a manner that equates violation of the
CWA with violation of a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
124. See 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1994).
125. See Public Interest Research Group, Inc. v. Magnesium Elektron, Inc., 123 F.3d 111 (3d Cir.
1997).
126. 123 F.3d 111 (3dCir. 1997).
127. See id. at 119-23.
128. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a).
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("NPDES") permit. 29 The judicially-enforceable provisions of those permits
consist of precise numerical limits on the permissible levels of discharges of
various substances, coupled with precise rules with respect to record-
keeping, testing, and reporting.130 The terms of the permit are determined by
the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") and state environmental
regulatory agencies. This feature of the CWA renders it unnecessary for a
court to address any of the difficult scientific and policy issues concerning
the appropriate level of emissions of a substance.
Second, a plaintiff cannot bring an action under the citizen suit provision
of the CWA without first providing the EPA and the relevant state agency
sixty days notice of his or her intent to do so. 13 ' Third, a court cannot
entertain an enforcement action brought by a citizen "if the [EPA] or State
has commenced and is diligently prosecuting a[n] ... action... to require
compliance with the standard, limitation, or order."' 132 These two conditions
on citizen suits provide additional means of insulating courts from the need
to become enmeshed in scientific or policy disputes. If the EPA or a state
agency decides that a planned citizen suit raises a scientific or policy issue of
concern to the agency, it can block the citizen suit by stepping into the shoes
of the citizen. In this legal environment, the courts are assigned a limited but
important role well within the competence of courts. A court's sole
responsibility is to enforce the congressionally-authorized, agency-created
terms of an NPDES permit. The Third Circuit, however, decided to
undertake a far more ambitious role in this legal regime.
PIRG sought civil penalties and injunctive relief against Magnesium
Elektron on the basis of numerous alleged violations of its emissions
permit' 133 Magnesium Elektron sought dismissal on the basis that PIRG
lacked standing to bring the action. 34 The district court held that PIRG had
129. See 33 U.S.C. § 1365(f); see also 33 U.S.C. § 1342.
130. Many permits also contain a broadly worded prohibition on discharges that would violate
water quality standards. Most courts have held that those provisions are not enforceable in a citizen
suit, however. See, e.g., Oregon Natural Resources Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 834 F.2d 842, 848-50
(9th Cir. 1987). At least one court has held that they are enforceable. See Northwest Envtl. Advocates
v. City of Portland, 56 F.3d 979, 985-90 (9th Cir. 1995). That decision shares the same basic flaw as
the Third Circuit's decision in Magnesium Elektron, It requires courts to perform tasks they are
institutionally incapable of performing. See Bruce Allen Morris, The Oregon Misstep and the Texas
Two Step: Two Recent Appellate Cases Expand CWA Citizen Suits, NATURAL RESOURCES & ENV'T,
Fall 1996, at 50.
131. See33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(A).
132. Id. § 1365(b)(1)(B).
133. See Public Interest Research Group, Inc. v. Magnesium Elektron, Inc., 123 F.3d 111 (3d Cir.
1997).
134. Seeid.atll5.
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standing.135 The district court relied on affidavits submitted by several PIRG
members to satisfy the "particularity" and "imminence" elements of
standing. 36 Magnesium Elektron's emissions flow into the Wickecheoke
Creek, which flows into the Delaware River. 37 Each afflant stated that he or
she regularly uses the Delaware River for a variety of recreational purposes
and each described a variety of ways in which he or she is injured by the
existence of pollutants in the River.'38 In finding that PIRG had standing, the
district court relied in part on studies that demonstrated that the substances
emitted by Magnesium Elektron have the potential to cause injuries to a river
and to its aquatic biota. In an earlier decision, the Third Circuit upheld the
district court's decision on standing.139
The district court then proceeded to the merits of the case. It found that
Magnesium Elektron had committed 150 violations of its emissions
permit. 40 It also issued an injunction prohibiting Magnesium Elektron from
engaging in future violations and imposed civil penalties.' 41 The district court
took one other action that proved to be important, however. In the penalty
phase, it admitted the affidavit of a limnologist retained by Magnesium
Elektron. 42 That affidavit expressed the opinion that Magnesium Elektron's
illegal emissions caused no harm to the Wickecheoke Creek because of
certain unusual characteristics of the water.' 43 On the basis of that affidavit,
the district court found that the unlawful emissions caused no harm to the
135. See Public Interest Research Group, Inc. v. Magnesium Elektron, Inc., No. 89-3193 (JCL),
1992 WL 16314 (D.N.J. Jan. 23, 1992).
136. Id. In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992), the Supreme Court held that a
membership organization lacked standing to obtain review of an agency decision because the members
of the group had not established that agency action would cause them "particularized" and "imminent"
injury. The decision in Lujan is both difficult to interpret and controversial. See Symposium, Tventy-
Fourth Annual Administrative Law Issue, 42 DUKE L.J. 1141 (1993); Cass R. Sunstein, What's
Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, Injuries, and Article 111, 91 MICH L. REv. 163 (1992). The
fatal flaw in the affidavits of the individuals in Lujan was their failure to establish a sufficient
connection to the situs of the injury. The injuries would take place in remote locations in other
countries, and the affidavits did not include statements that the individuals planned to visit those
locations at some time in the near future. In Magnesium Elektron, the Third Circuit recognized that the
individuals' affidavits did not share this flaw. In the majority's words, "we have no doubt that PIRG's
members use the Delaware River." 123 F.3d at 120.
137. See Magnesium Elektron, 123 F.3d at 115.
138. See id. at 116 (citing Magnesium Elektron, 1992 WI, 16314, at *14-*15). On appeal, the
Third Circuit affirmed. See id. (citing Public Interest Research Group, Inc. v. Magnesium Elektron,
Inc., 983 F.2d 1052 (3d Cir. 1992)).
139. See Magnesium Elektron, 983 F.2d 1052 (3d Cir. 1992).
140. See Magnesium Elektron, 123 F.3d at 115 (citing Magnesium Elektron, 1992 WL 16314).
141. See id. at 115-16 (citingMagnesium Eletron, 1992 WL 16314).
142. See id. at 116 (citing Public Interest Research Group, Inc. v. Magnesium Elektron, Inc., No.
89-3193 (JCL), 1995 WL 461252 (D.N.L Mar. 9, 1995)).
143. See id. at 116, 123 (citing Magnesium Elektron, 1995 WL 461252).
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creek. 144 Neither the affidavit nor the district court opinion addressed the
issue that formed the basis for the prior holding that PIRG had standing. The
holding was based on the finding that Magnesium Elektron's emissions
caused injury to the Delaware River, which in turn caused harm to PIRG's
members.
145
Magnesium Elektron then appealed the district court's decision for a
second time. It attempted to reargue the issue of PIRG's standing. A two-
judge majority of a Third Circuit panel held that the standing issue was so
important that it justified a departure from the law of the case doctrine. 14 6
The majority then held that the affidavit of the limnologist and the district
court's finding of no harm to the creek rebutted PIRG's claim to standing.147
The majority held that PIRG lacked standing, reasoning: (1) PIRG had the
burden of proving that Magnesium Elektron's emissions caused harm to
water quality at each stage of the proceeding, including the penalty stage;
148
(2) the affidavit and finding created doubt that Magnesium Elektron's illegal
emissions caused harm either to Wickecheoke Creek or to the Delaware
River;,149 (3) in that situation, PIRG had the burden to submit additional
evidence sufficient to establish a specific causal relationship between the
emissions and harm to either the creek or the river; 50 (4) PIRO failed to meet
that burden;' 5' and, therefore, (5) the case must be dismissed for lack of
144. See id. at 116 (citing Magnesium Elektron, 1995 WL 461252).
145. See Magnesium Elektron, 1992 WL 16314.
146. See Magnesium Elektron, 123 F.3d at 116-19. The law of the case doctrine "directs courts to
refrain from re-deciding issues that were resolved earlier in the litigation." Il at 116.
147. Seeid. at 119-25.
148. Seeid. at ll7.
149. Seeiatll9.
150. See id.
151. See id. at 119-23. At one point in the opinion, the majority characterizes the fatal defect in
the individuals' affidavits as a failure to establish an "injury," as opposed to a failure to establish a
causal relationship between the illegal emissions and an injury. See id. at 121-22. The majority
obviously felt compelled to engage in this characterization game to avoid recognizing that its holding
is inconsistent with the holding in a prior circuit opinion. See Public Interest Research Group, Inc. v.
Powell Duffryn Terminals Inc., 913 F.2d 64 (3d Cir. 1990). Powell Duffryn held that an affidavit
establishes a sufficient causal relationship if it states
that a defendant has (1) discharged some pollutant in concentrations greater than allowed by its
permit (2) into a waterway in which the plaintiffs have an interest that is or may be adversely
affected by the pollutant and that (3) this pollutant causes or contributes to the kinds of injuries
alleged by the plaintiffs.
Id. at72.
The majority's characterization does not work. The majority uses causal reasoning thoughout its
opinion. Thus, for instance, the majority says at one point in the opinion, "Here, we have no doubt that
PIRG's members use the Delaware River. On the other hand, we are less confident that MEI's
discharges have or will cause any injury to that waterway." Magnesium Elektron, 123 F.3d at 120
(emphasis added). In another passage, the majority says that "the only way PIRG could have met its
injury requirement was to show that MEI's discharge violations posed a threat of injury to the
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standing.
152
The dissenting judge criticized the majority on many grounds, including:
(1) PIRG had no reason to believe that standing remained a live issue during
the penalty phase of the proceeding; (2) PIRG had no notice that it had any
burden to produce additional evidence that Magnesium Elektron's illegal
emissions caused harm to water quality during the penalty phase; (3) the
affidavit of the limnologist addressed only harm to water quality in the Creek
and not harm to water quality in the Delaware River; (4) it is entirely
plausible that Magnesium Elektron's illegal emissions caused harm to water
quality in the Delaware River even if the court were to accept as accurate all
of the opinions expressed in the affidavit of the limnologist; (5) it is entirely
plausible that PIRG could prove that harm if it were given an opportunity to
do so; and, (6) the court should have remanded the standing issue to the
District Court to provide PIRG an opportunity to prove that Magnesium
Elektron's illegal emissions caused harm to the water quality of the Delaware
River.1
53
A. Critique of the Third Circuit Test
The majority opinion in Magnesium Elektron is seriously flawed in many
respects, some of which are described in the dissenting opinion.154 To fully
appreciate the misunderstandings that infect the opinion, however, it is
necessary to understand the procedures through which the EPA and state
agencies issue emissions permits. An emissions permit contains explicit
numerical ceilings applicable to all pollutants a facility is authorized to emit.
These numerical limits have one of two sources. Some are technology based,
predicated on the agency's determination that the owner of the facility should
use available technology that is capable of limiting its emissions of substance
members' recreational interests in the Delaware River and Raritan Canal." Id. at 122 (emphasis
added).
In several passages, the majority suggests that the fatal defect in petitioner's case for standing was
its failure to prove that the Delaware River is polluted. See, e.g., id. at 121. It is hard to take that
assertion seriously. The longstanding water quality problems in the Delaware River are well known to
anyone who reads or who has any contact with the river. See generally Richard C. Albert, The
Historical Context of Water Quality Management for the Delaware Estuary, 11 ESTUARIES 99 (1988).
This is the kind of fact that any court should notice. See 2 KENNETH GULP DAVIS & RICHARD J.
PIERCE, JR., ADMrNSTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 10.5-.6 (3d ed. 1994); see also Associated Gas
Distribs. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 824 F.2d 981, 1008 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (party does "not
need to conduct experiments in order to rely on the prediction that an unsupported stone will fall").
152. See Magnesium Elekron, 123 F.3d at 125.
153. See id at 125-26 (Lewis, J., dissenting).
154. See id.; see also supra note 151.
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A to no more than X units.' 55 Others are water quality-based limits.156
Agencies establish those limits by determining whether there is a "reasonable
potential" for emissions of substance A above level X "to cause or contribute
to, an excursion above" the water quality standards applicable to the water
bodies potentially affected by the emissions.1
57
The district court found that Magnesium Elektron had violated four
provisions of its emissions permit. It had repeatedly exceeded the numerical
limits on thermal discharges, emissions of salt, and emissions of total organic
carbon, and it had repeatedly violated the reporting conditions of its
permit. 158 The emissions limit applicable to thermal discharges is technology
based. The emissions limits applicable to salt and total organic carbon are
water quality based. Specifically, the permitting agency determined that
emissions of salt or total organic carbon above the limits set in the permit
would harm the water quality of the Delaware River.159 The majority opinion
is seriously flawed even with respect to its treatment of the violations of the
technology-based limit and of the reporting conditions.1 60 The flaws in the
opinion are easiest to understand, however, in the context of the violations of
the water quality-based emissions limits.
The most obvious flaw is institutional. The court should not even have
considered the affidavit of Magnesium Elektron's limnologist on the issue of
whether its illegal emissions caused harm to the creek and the river. In the
case of the water quality-based emissions limits, the issue had already been
resolved by the permitting agency.
An applicant for an emissions permit has access to an elaborate
155. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 131 l(b), 1314(b), 1317(a) (1994). See generally Morris, supra note 130, at
50.
156. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313; see also 40 C.F.R. § 122.44(d) (1997) (describing manner in which
permit writers must correlate emissions limits with water quality standards). See generally Morris,
supra note 130, at 50.
157. In re Broward County, Fla., NPDES Appeal No. 95-7, 1996 WL 514111, at *13 n.2 (E.P.A.
Aug. 27, 1996) (citations omitted) (order denying review).
158. See Magnesium Eleklron, 123 F.3d at 115, 123.
159. The limit applicable to salt was the product of negotiations with the Delaware River Basin
Commission. See Stipulation Between Magnesium Elektron, Department of Environmental Protection
of the State of New Jersey, and Delaware River Basin Commission (July 9, 1979). The limit on total
organic carbon was determined through application of a computer model that predicts the level of
dissolved oxygen in the river as a function of emissions of oxygen demanding substances. See
generally Albert, supra note 151, at 103-04, 106.
160. The difference between technology-based limits and water quality-based limits is not as stark
as the names imply. An applicant for a permit can apply for modifications of technology-based limits
based in part on water quality. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(g) (1994).
Violations of reporting requirements cause harm to all users of a water body, since the reported
emissions data is used to monitor water quality and to determine the level of emissions that can be
permitted without violating water quality standards.
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multitiered set of procedures for determining whether its emissions cause
harm to water bodies. 61 That decision-making process is described in, and
illustrated by, the multiple agency decisions with respect to the application of
the Broward County Public Works Department.162 Broward applied for a
permit that would authorize it to emit a large quantity of total residual
chlorine ("TRC"). The EPA regional office published a draft permit that
would have allowed Broward to emit a smaller quantity of TRC. The
regional office also provided an explanation of the bases for the conditions in
the draft permit. Broward submitted comments on the draft permit in which it
maintained, among other things, that the TRC limit in the draft permit was
based on an erroneous finding that Broward's emissions have the reasonable
potential to cause a violation of Florida's water quality criteria for TRC.
Broward further alleged that the test species of aquatic biota specified in the
draft permit are not significant to the indigenous aquatic community. The
regional office found those comments unpersuasive, rejected Broward's
request for an evidentiary hearing, and issued a permit containing the same
TRC limits as the draft permit."'
Broward appealed to the EPA Environmental Appeals Board. The Board
concluded that the regional office had not adequately supported its findings
with respect to either the causal relationship between Broward's emissions
and the water quality standards or with respect to the presence of the test
species in the indigenous environment.164 It remanded the proceeding to the
regional office with instructions that it supplement the record and reconsider
its findings with respect to those issues. 15 On remand, the regional office
conducted further proceedings and supplemented the record on those issues.
It reissued the permit with the same limit on TRC emissions. Broward then
appealed again. This time, however, the Appeals Board upheld the findings
of the regional office as adequately supported by the extensive evidence in
the augmented record.166 The Appeals Board also noted that Broward had the
right to obtain reconsideration of the limits in its permit in the future if it
believed that changes in circumstances or in the available evidence justified a
161. See Procedures for Decisionmaking, 40 C.F.R. § 124 (1997); see also Nancy B. Firestone &
Elizabeth C. Brown, Ensuring the Fairness of Agency Adjudications: The Environmental Appeals
Board's First Four Years, 2 ENVTL. LAW. 291,321-25 (1996).
162. See Broward County, 1996 WL 514111; In re Broward County, Florida, NPDES Appeal No.
92-11, 1993 WL 208895 (E.P.A. June 7, 1993).
163. See Broward County, 1996 WL 514111, at *2-*3.
164. See Broward County, 1993 WL 208895, at *5, *7.
165. Seeid.at*10.
166. See Broward County, 1996 WL 514111, at *5-*8.
[VOL. 76:1307
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol76/iss4/3
1998] CAUSATION IN GOVERNMENT REGULATION AND TOXIC TORTS 1335
finding that it could emit more TRC without harming water quality. 67
Broward declined to avail itself of its right to obtain judicial review of the
permitting agency's decision.
The Broward case illustrates four related points. First, the water quality-
based limits on emissions contained in a permit are predicated on an
agency's determination that emissions above that level cause harm to a
potentially affected body of water and the aquatic biota it supports. Second,
an applicant for a permit has ample opportunities to contest the agency's
findings with respect to causation during the permitting process. Third, the
applicant has the right to obtain judicial review of the agency's findings with
respect to causation. 168 Fourth, the applicant has the right to petition to obtain
an increase in its allowable emissions if it believes that it can emit more of a
substance without causing harm to relevant water bodies.
In this situation, it is well established that a court is precluded from
making a finding in an enforcement proceeding that differs from the agency's
finding. 169 The only court that has any power to act in a manner contrary to
the agency's finding is a court that receives a timely petition to review the
agency's permitting decision.'70 Even then, the reviewing court's powers are
limited. It must uphold the agency's action unless it is arbitrary and
capricious.' 7' It cannot substitute its findings for those of the agency.
172
Moreover, it cannot accept evidence that was not in the record before the
agency, except in narrow circumstances that did not exist in Magnesium
Elektron,173 and it cannot consider arguments that were not made to the
agency.' 74 Magnesium Elektron submitted the affidavit of its limnologist to
the wrong forum. If it wanted to try to establish that emissions above the
level authorized by its permit do not harm water quality, it should have filed
a petition to amend its permit with the issuing agency.
167. See id. at *9.
168. See 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1) (1994).
169. Section 1369(b)(1) authorizes judicial review of any permitting decision within 120 days of
the decision. Section 1369(b)(2) forbids judicial review of the agency's decision in any enforcement
proceeding. Such limitations on judicial review are valid and must be respected by a court. See Adamo
Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275 (1978). See generally 2 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note
151, § 15.2; 3 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 151, § 17.8.
170. The petition for review must be filed within 120 days of the issuance of the permit. See 33
U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1).
171. See generally 2 DAVIS& PIERCE, supra note 151, § 11.4.
172. For an overview ofjudicial review of agency adjudications, see id. at §§ 11.1-11.5.
173. See 33 U.S.C. § 1369(c); see also S. REP. NO. 92-414 (1971), reprinted in 1972
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3745 (courts should not reanalyze technological considerations in enforcement
proceeding).
174. See 2 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 151, § 15.8.
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B. The Third Circuit Test Violates Separation ofPowers Principles
Separation of powers principles forbid a court from finding that a causal
relationship does not exist after an agency has found that the causal
relationship does exist. Congress assigned the task to an agency and not to
the courts. Congress only authorized courts to engage in limited scope review
of the agency decisions. Congress also instructed courts to enforce emissions
permits at the behest of any citizen. A court cannot act in ways that are
inconsistent with congressional commands unless it has a constitutional basis
for doing so.
The Third Circuit relied on the Article III limitation on judicial power to
justify its refusal to enforce the congressional command at issue in
Magnesium Elektron.175 It used a two-step reasoning process. First, a plaintiff
must prove injury in fact caused by defendant's conduct as an Article IlI
constitutional prerequisite to the exercise of judicial power.176 Second, the
plaintiff failed to prove one of the elements of causation, that is, the
emissions injured the potentially affected bodies of water. 177 That reasoning
process does not work in this context, however, because the permitting
agency had already made the finding of causation pursuant to a congressional
delegation of the power to do so. In this situation, a court called upon to
enforce the permit cannot second-guess the agency's finding.178
The irony in the Third Circuit's opinion is readily apparent. The court
relied on separation of powers-the Article mH limitation on judicial power-
to justify an action that clearly violates separation of powers principles.
Article HI is designed to confine the role of the judiciary within boundaries
appropriate to the characteristics of that institution. 179 Yet, the Third Circuit
relied on Article III as a justification for a significant expansion of the
judicial role that takes power away from the politically accountable branches
of government. This is a classic illustration of institutional
"aggrandizemen'--a practice the Supreme Court has frequently condemned
as a violation of separation of powers. 80
175. See Public Interest Research Group, Inc. v. Magnesium Elektron, Inc., 123 F.3d 111, 118 (3d
Cir. 1997).
176. See id. at 120-22.
177. See id. at 122-25.
178. See supra notes 169-74 and accompanying text.
179. See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State,
Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471-74 (1982); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-500 (1975); see also Antonin
Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U.
L. REV. 881 (1983).
180. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 120-24 (1976). See generally I DAVIS & PIERCE,
supra note 151, § 2.4.
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C. Causation Per Se
The easiest way to understand the appropriate role of a court in a case like
Magnesium Elektron is by analogy to the negligence per se doctrine. 181 In a
common-law negligence case, some combination of judge and jury must
apply the familiar formula for determining negligence first announced by
Learned Hand in United States v. Carroll Towing Co.182 In many cases,
however, that is an extraordinarily difficult decision-making process. 83 It
often requires access to, and analysis of, extensive, complicated data. It also
often requires comparison of incommensurable values, such as, risks to life
or health versus expenditures of scarce resources. In the absence of
applicable statutes or regulations, judges and juries have no choice but to
perform those tasks as well as they can-at high costs and with high rates of
error. If a legislature or an agency has already performed the difficult tasks of
gathering the relevant data, analyzing that data, and comparing the
conflicting values at stake, however, no court believes that it has either the
duty or the discretion to second-guess the results of that decision-making
process. 84 Legislatures and agencies are vastly superior to courts for
purposes of performing each of those functions. Courts acknowledge those
comparative institutional advantages by routinely applying the negligence
per se doctrine. By invoking that doctrine, the courts also further many other
collateral goals. They increase the predictability of the legal system, they
reduce the transaction costs of the legal system, and they increase the
efficacy of the rules that legislatures and agencies issue.
A case like Magnesium Elektron provides a perfect context for
announcing a new doctrine of causation per se. The analogy to negligence
per se is perfect. The legislature has assigned to an agency the task of
determining the level at which emissions of a substance causes harm to water
bodies. The agency has performed that task and expressed the results in the
form of a specific, easily enforced rule. A court should accord that decision
the same respect it accords an agency decision that sets the speed limit in a
particular location at thirty-five miles per hour or that requires a vessel to
have a specified number of lifeboats.
In this situation, it makes no sense to require a plaintiff in an enforcement
action to prove that particular violations of an emissions permit caused harm
to particular water bodies. That would be an extraordinarily difficult and
181. See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW 79 (1997).
182. 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
183. See ABRAHAM, supra note 181, at 61-67.
184. Seeid. at79.
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expensive undertaking. The facts of Magnesium Elektron illustrate the nature
of the task. The Delaware River has myriad water quality problems that are
attributable to a complicated combination of legal and illegal emissions from
thousands of sources.18 5 It would be virtually impossible for a party to an
enforcement procedure to present evidence sufficient to isolate the causal
effects of Magnesium Elektron's illegal emissions on water quality in the
Delaware River. Moreover, it makes no sense for a court to attempt this
daunting task when permitting agencies already set emissions limits through
a decision-making process that is specifically designed to prohibit emissions
that will cause harm to water bodies. Compared to agencies, judges are at an
enormous disadvantage in this context They know little about toxicology.
They lack the massive database necessary to correlate emissions from
thousands of sources with scores of potential water quality problems. They
lack access to procedures that would enable them to obtain that data. They
lack the analytical skills and computer software necessary to evaluate the
relevant data if they could amass it. Finally, they lack the authority to make
such decisions. Congress has wisely delegated that power to water pollution
control agencies.
The judiciary is well aware of its severe institutional shortcomings in the
toxic tort context. For decades, federal judges have pled with Congress to
relieve the judiciary of tasks for which it is poorly suited. They requested the
creation of administrative decision-making structures specifically tailored to
confront the many challenges posed by the complicated world of toxic
torts. 8 6 Thus, for instance, the Court began its 1997 opinion in Amchem
Products, Inc. v. Windsor187 by listing a string of terrible problems the courts
have encountered, or inadvertently created, in the asbestos context. The
Court then bemoaned the failure of Congress to create an agency-
administered program that would relieve the courts of tasks they are
incapable of performing well, as the Judicial Conference had urged in a 1991
report.1
8 8
When Congress does create an agency-administered program to deal with
an important and complicated subset of toxicity disputes, it ill behooves
judges to refuse to enforce the program the legislature has created. Yet, that
is exactly what the Third Circuit did in Magnesium Elektron. Congress
relieved the courts of the extraordinarily difficult task of deciding what levels
of emissions of various substances will, or will not, harm a water body by
185. See Albert, supra note 151.
186. See, e.g., JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 38.
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assigning that task to agencies that are better suited to the task. Congress left
courts with only one narrow, but crucial, responsibility: to enforce the
emissions limits the agencies establish. The courts should fulfill that
responsibility without attempting to perform tasks that agencies have already
performed and that courts cannot perform in an acceptable manner.
III. CONCLUSION
The U.S. legal system is encountering extreme difficulties in its efforts to
address the phenomenon of toxicity. Some combination of legal institutions
must make a series of decisions with respect to tens of thousands of
substances that are potentially toxic in some circumstances. Those decisions
include: How much evidence now exists with respect to the relationship
between various forms of exposure to a substance and various forms of
harm? How much of society's scarce resources should we devote to the task
of determining the existence and characteristics of such causal relationships?
And what types of legal actions are justified by the available evidence with
respect to these causal relationships?
These questions are extraordinarily difficult to answer because they
require access to massive data, combined with application of sophisticated
scientific and economic expertise. They are also paradigmatic public policy
questions, the answers to which will have enormous implications for the
health and welfare of the U.S. population. Any search for answers to those
questions must begin at the institutional level. What institution, or
combination of institutions, is best equipped to answer questions of this
nature? The Supreme Court recognized the importance of that question and
answered it correctly at the beginning of its opinion in Amchem Products.
189
For a host of reasons, agencies acting under authority delegated by Congress
are far more capable of answering these questions than are judges and juries.
Both the Berger version of the no-cause proposal and the Third Circuit's
decision in Magnesium Elektron are fatally flawed because they fail to
recognize the importance of assigning tasks based on comparative
institutional competence. 190 Both would assign to the judiciary tasks that are
outside of its institutional competence. Wagner's no-cause proposal provides
a promising start for a potentially beneficial reform, however. Unlike Berger
and the authors of the Third Circuit opinion, Wagner recognizes the
importance of the institutional decision and looks in the right direction for
189. Seeid. at2237-38.
190. See NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW,
ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994).
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reforms. Any meaningful progress in this difficult area of law is almost
entirely dependent on actions taken by the politically accountable branches of
government
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol76/iss4/3
